

Table of contents

Outline	5
Avant-propos	9
Foreword	13

PART 1

GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION

CHAPITRE 1. – Le fonctionnement du marché intérieur de l’Union européenne devrait-il être repensé pour intégrer les impacts environnementaux des technologies numériques ?	19
Camille BOURGUIGNON	
Introduction	19
I. – L’absence d’intégration des enjeux environnementaux dans le principe de libre circulation des services de la société de l’information	26
II. – Les conséquences de l’absence d’intégration des enjeux environnementaux dans le principe de libre circulation des services de la société de l’information	33
III. – L’intégration souhaitable des enjeux environnementaux dans le principe de libre circulation des services de la société de l’information	38
Conclusion	42
CHAPTER 2. – How Blockchain Could Impact the Relationship Between Public Authorities and SMEs	43
Ludovic DESCHAMPS Matthieu HARDY	
Introduction	43
I. – The revolutionary potential of blockchain	44
II. – The specific needs of SMEs	46

III. – European initiatives to support the development of blockchain	47
IV. – Opportunities to Support Belgian and European SMEs Through DLTs	49
A. Regulated profession, freedom of movement and mutual recognition	49
1. Regulated profession: what, why, how?	49
2. DLTs to enforce the regulation of professions?	51
3. Implication on the relations between authorities and SMEs	52
4. Freedom of movement and mutual recognition	53
B. Public procurement and access to SMEs	55
1. Principles	55
2. Modalities and structuring in the context of public procurement	56
3. The procedures related to public procurement	57
4. Central purchasing body	57
5. Mandatory grounds for exclusion	58
Conclusion	58
CHAPITRE 3. – <i>Pornhub</i> selon une perspective cyberféministe : Vers une responsabilité coopérative et une gouvernance multiniveau	61
Évelyne JEAN-BOUCHARD	
Sandrine PROM TEP	
Maya CACHECHO	
Introduction	61
I. – <i>Pornhub</i> et la gouvernance des plateformes	62
II. – Le consentement et le droit à l’oubli numérique	66
III. – Le cyberféminisme	68
IV. – Les responsabilités partagées	71
A. Les plateformes	71
B. Les utilisateurs	72
V. – L’État	74
Conclusion	76

PART 2
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE

CHAPTER 1. – The directive on whistleblowers to the test of the digital society: Between hope and desillusion	79
Dimitrios KAFTERANIS & Amélie LACHAPELLE	
Introduction	79
I. – Why do we need to take seriously persons who blow the whistle in the digital technology area?	81
A. The need to ensure security of networks and information systems	81
B. The need to have watchdogs in the digital environment to ensure the respect for human rights	83
II. – Is the “technological risk” totally covered by the scope of the Directive?	84
A. Reporting channels in the privacy, data protection and cybersecurity area	85
B. The whistleblower, a vital link in the risk management policies	87
C. The Union acts mentioned in the Annex of the DWB	89
III. – Are all the potential whistleblowers in digital technology matters covered by the Directive?	90
A. The work-related context	91
B. The motivation of the reporting person	93
C. The granting of a bounty	94
Conclusion	95
CHAPTER 2. – The Role of User-Generated Evidence in Criminal Investigations Versus the Removal of Terrorist Content Online: Towards a More Balanced Approach	97
Eline LABEY Juncal MONTERO REGULES	
Introduction	97
I. – User-Generated Evidence and the Role of SMPs	98
II. – Case Study: YouTube and The Syrian Armed Conflict	101

III. – EU’S Strategy to Counter the Spread of Terrorist Content Online	103
A. EU Initiatives and Soft Law Instruments	103
1. EU Internet Forum	103
2. EU Internet Referral Unit (“EU IRU”)	104
3. EU Crisis Protocol	105
4. EU Security Union Strategy	105
5. New Counter-Terrorism Agenda	106
B. Terrorist Content Online Regulation	107
1. Geographical, personal, and material scope	107
2. Obligations for HSPs	108
3. Competent authority of the EU Member State	110
4. Penalties	110
5. Use of automated means	110
6. Towards more removal of terrorist content online?	111
Conclusion and Recommendations	112
CHAPTER 3. – Mandatory Information under GDPR:	
A Conceptual Model for Automated Privacy Policy Analysis	115
Sébastien MEEÛS	
Introduction	115
I. – Purposes	116
II. – Overview of the key elements of privacy policies	118
A. A construction resulting from practice	118
B. The legal obligations, principles, and rights that shape privacy policies	118
C. The function(s) of privacy policies	119
III. – The compliance of privacy policies	120
A. The tasks of compliance checking	120
1. Document to Regulation	120
2. Document to Document	120
B. Current and prospective assessment methods	121
IV. – Shaping the “Mandatory Information”	121
A. Information to be provided in accordance with Articles 13 and 14	121
1. Information that must always be mentioned in the document	122
2. Optional information	122
3. Challenges	123

B.	Children and consent	124
1.	Age of consent	125
2.	Evidence of consent	125
3.	Challenges	126
C.	Security measures	126
V.	– Building and testing the conceptual model	127
A.	Conceptual model	127
1.	Research basis	129
2.	Metadata relationships	129
B.	Human-annotated privacy policies	131
C.	Early results	132
	Conclusion and future work	132
CHAPTER 4. – Personal data class actions three years after the application of the GDPR		135
	Grégory RENIER	
	Introduction	135
I.	– Representation & Collective Redress in the GDPR	138
II.	– The solution established in Belgian and French law	139
A.	Action for Collective Redress in Belgium	139
1.	The scope of application of the action for collective redress	140
2.	Presentation of the procedure	142
B.	The solution enshrined in French law: Group Action in France	143
1.	Representation in matters of personal data	143
2.	Presentation of the procedure	144
III.	– Areas of application and role of supervisory authorities through the illustration of recent decisions	146
A.	Specific data protection provisions	146
1.	The GDPR and the Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC	146
2.	Other specific provisions: the example of consumer credit	147
3.	Codes of conduct?	147
B.	General or cross-cutting data protection provisions	148
1.	Unfair commercial practices	148
2.	Unfair terms	150
3.	Anti-competitive practices	151

IV. – The adoption of Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions: what to expect?	153
Conclusion	155
CHAPITRE 5. – ARRCIS : Évaluation et renforcement de la conformité réglementaire d’un système d’information	159
Antoine SACRÉ Jean-Noël COLIN Benoît HOSSELET	
Introduction	159
I. – Une solution : faciliter l’évaluation de la conformité des systèmes	161
II. – Travaux connexes	162
III. – Modélisation des normes	164
A. Normes prises en compte	164
B. Caractéristiques de la modélisation	164
C. Extractions des informations	165
D. Modélisation des informations	166
IV. – Méthode d’évaluation de la conformité des systèmes d’information	168
A. Sélection des exigences pertinentes Questionnaire	169 169
B. Processus d’évaluation de la conformité	171
V. – Application à un cas et discussion	172
Conclusion	174
Bibliographie	175
CHAPTER 6. – Freedom versus Security: Methods of Controlling Information Access by Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies	177
Pál VADÁSZ Zsolt ZÓDI Csaba CSÁKI	
Introduction: who guards the guards?	177
I. – Emergence of disruptive technologies	179
II. – Potential irregularities in the practices of LEA and IC organizations	180

III. – Arguments in favor of relaxing legal constraints	180
IV. – Tools and methods to ensure oversight	182
V. – Procedural tools and methods to ensure oversight	182
VI. – Technical tools and methods to ensure oversight	184
VII. – The legal framework to ensure oversight	185
Conclusion	188
References	189
PART 3	
DATA	
CHAPTER 1. – High-altitude surveillance and data protection: Space, the final frontier of privacy?	195
Anne-Valentine RENSONNET	
Alexandre CASSART	
Introduction	195
I. – Delimitation Between Airspace and Outer Space	197
A. Air Law	198
B. Outer Space Law	198
The Resolution on the Principles of Remote Sensing and its weaknesses	201
II. – The Processing of Data in Outer Space and Privacy	203
A. Is the GDPR Applicable in Outer Space?	204
1. Establishment Criterion	204
2. Targeting Criterion	204
3. Extension by Virtue of Public International Law	205
B. Material Scope	206
1. Personal data – Possible identification	206
2. Exclusions	206
Conclusion	207
CHAPTER 2. – The end of third-party cookies: nothing but smoke and mirrors if the RTB winner takes it all?	209
Fanny COTON	
Victoria RUELLE	
Introduction	209
I. – Cookies and Their Heirs	210

A.	Legislative Frame	210
1.	E-Privacy Directive and GDPR	210
2.	Future E-Privacy Regulation	211
3.	Legislative Gaps: The Cookie Wall and the Pay Wall	214
B.	Third-Party Cookies: Raw Material for RTB	217
C.	Federated Learning of Cohorts (“FLoC”): The Google Alternative	219
D.	First-Party Cookies: A Better Alternative?	222
E.	Competition Issues	223
II.	Real Time Bidding: A GDPR-Compliant Mechanism?	224
A.	Consent	226
1.	Informed Consent and Transparency	228
2.	Explicit Consent	229
3.	Proof of consent	230
B.	Qualification of Actors	231
C.	Data Minimization	231
D.	Security	231
III.	Perspective	232
CHAPITRE 3. – Le consommateur de données		235
Malo DEPINCÉ		
I.	Le consommateur qui transfère	240
A.	Les dispositions spécifiques du règlement général sur la protection des données personnelles	240
B.	Les dispositions générales du Code de la consommation	243
II.	Le consommateur qui reçoit	246
A.	Le service reçu et sa conformité	247
B.	Le droit au retour des données : la portabilité	248
CHAPTER 4. – Privacy concerns related to the digital tax administration 2.0		253
Sylvie DE RAEDT		
Introduction and limitation of the scope of this contribution		253
I.	The extent of the legal protection in the post GDPR era – research question and methodology	255
II.	The intentions of the legislator in repealing the existing model	257

III. – The scope of the protocol duty	260
A. The risk of exchanging personal data that is not strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of the public authority	260
B. The risk of incompatible reuse	263
C. The risk of non-transparent exchange of information	265
IV. – Are we going backwards?	267
CHAPTER 5. – All’s FAIR in Europe?	269
Freya DE SCHAMPHELAERE	
Introduction	269
I. – From Public Sector Information to Open Data	272
A. Public Sector Information directives	272
B. Open Data movement	274
C. Open Science movement	274
D. Open Data Directive	275
II. – Definition of research data	276
A. Characteristics of the definition	276
1. Digital form	276
2. Other than scientific articles	276
3. Evidence or commonly accepted	277
4. Also including meta data	277
B. Research data as collected by the SODHA – repository	277
III. – Principles governing the availability of research data (Art. 10, § 1 Open Data Directive)	278
A. Principles	279
1. Principle of ‘open by default’	279
2. FAIR – principles	279
3. ‘As open as possible, as closed as necessary’	280
B. Access to research data through the SODHA repository	281
1. Open access vs restricted access	281
2. Access to sensitive research data	282
IV. – Re-use of research data (Art. 10, § 2 Open Data Directive)	284
A. Re-use of research data	284
1. Re-usable research data is publicly funded	284
2. Re-usable research data has already been made available	285
3. Beware of other interests	285

B.	Re-use through the SODHA repository	286
1.	General information	286
2.	Three re-use regimes	286
V.	All's FAIR in Europe?	287
A.	Availability of research data	287
B.	Re-use of research data	288
C.	All's fair in Europe?	288
CHAPITRE 6. – Big Data dans l'IA et principe de minimisation : Défis et risques		289
Sophie EVERARTS DE VELP		
CHAPITRE 7. – Données à caractère personnel et sécurité des systèmes d'information : quand faut-il siffler la fin de la récréation ?		299
Jean-François HENROTTE		
Fanny COTON		
	Introduction	299
I.	Violations dont le signalement est protégé	302
A.	Dispositions dont la violation est concernée	302
B.	Notion de « violation »	303
C.	Cas de « violations » envisageables	304
1.	Violations de sécurité impliquant une obligation de notification du responsable	304
2.	Niveaux de sécurité inadéquats	307
3.	Faits sanctionnés pénalement	308
4.	Non-respect des recommandations et lignes directrices	309
II.	Cheminement de l'alerte	310
A.	L'obligation de désigner un DPD	310
B.	Le DPD échelon du système d'alerte	311
C.	Signalement à l'autorité compétente	312
D.	Signalement au grand public	314
1.	En tant qu'ultime échelon du système d'alerte	314
2.	Directement	315
III.	Le DPD, lanceur d'alerte ?	315
A.	Cadre	316
B.	Mission particulière du DPD	317

C. Obstacle ?	318
D. Application du système d’alerte mis en place au DPD	319
Conclusion	319
CHAPTER 8. – Automated Decision-Making Under Amsterdam’s District Court Judgements:	321
Guillermo LAZCOZ	
Introduction: Algorithmic regulation in the legal discussion	321
I. – Uber transparency request case – UTR –	323
II. – Ola transparency request case – OTR –	325
III. – Uber deactivation case – UD –	327
IV. – Algorithmic regulation and the GDPR in the Amsterdam District Court’s judgements	328
V. – Limitations to the right of access	330
VI. – Art. 22(1): General prohibition or a right to object on request?	331
VII. – The production of legal or significant effects	332
VIII. – Human intervention in 22(1) decisions	333
IX. – Is there a right to an explanation for decisions based solely on automated processing?	334
Conclusions and future work	335
Acknowledgements	336
References	336
CHAPTER 9. – Big Boss is Watching You: Is Technology a Good or a Bad Thing for Human Employees?	339
Nicolas ROLAND	
I. – Setting the scene	339
II. – What is the current and prospective legal framework?	342
A. Privacy is a cornerstone	342
1. Privacy is a fundamental human right	342
2. The regulation is multifold	343
3. What do the judges look for?	343
4. So, what to keep in mind?	345

B.	Is there any “right to disconnect”?	345
C.	Does technology conflict with the “well-being at work” legislation?	346
III.	– Concluding remarks	347

PART 4

CONTRACT AND LIABILITY

CHAPTER 1. – Agile Project Management and Contract Law	351
Alexandre CRUQUENAIRE	
I. – Agile (Scrum) in a nutshell	352
II. – Legal questions raised by the use of Agile in IT contracts	353
A.	The scope of the advice obligation 353
B.	The collaboration obligation 355
C.	The acceptance of the provided services 356
D.	The scope of the warranty obligation 358
Conclusion	358
CHAPITRE 2. – Quelques réflexions sur la rencontre des véhicules autonomes avec le droit des assurances	359
Thomas DERVAL	
David-Alexandre SAUVAGE	
Introduction	359
I. – L’assurance obligatoire de la responsabilité en matière de véhicules automoteurs	366
A.	Présentation de la loi du 21 novembre 1989 366
B.	Rencontre entre la loi du 21 novembre 1989 et les véhicules autonomes 373
II. – Le futur de l’assurance (responsabilité civile) face aux véhicules autonomes	378
Conclusion	384

CHAPTER 3. – Intermediary liability and freedom of expression in the algorithmic age: swaying the balance?	387
Valentina GOLUNOVA	
I. – Introduction	387
II. – Algorithmic Content Moderation	389
III. – Impact of Algorithmic Content Moderation on the EU “Safe Harbour” Regime	392
A. “Passive” v. “active” providers	392
B. Knowledge test	394
C. Expeditious action	396
D. Prohibition on general monitoring	399
IV. – Impact on the Freedom of Expression	401
V. – Conclusion	402

PART 5

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

CHAPITRE 1. – Les armes létales autonomes et le droit international humanitaire : le nécessaire contrôle humain sur l’usage de la force	407
Noémi BONTRIDDER	
Introduction	408
I. – C’est au combattant humain qu’incombe l’obligation de respecter les principes de distinction, de proportionnalité et de précaution	415
A. Les machines ne sont pas liées par le droit	415
B. Seul le combattant humain est légalement habilité à participer directement aux hostilités	419
C. Une attaque est lancée dès l’activation d’une arme	421
II. – Le combattant doit évaluer si l’attaque est conforme au principe de distinction	422
A. La détermination des cibles humaines légitimes est complexe	423
B. La détermination du caractère militaire d’un objectif nécessite un jugement	426

C. La sélection et l'engagement d'une cible par une arme autonome sont intrinsèquement imprévisibles	427
III. – Le combattant doit évaluer si l'attaque est conforme au principe de proportionnalité	432
IV. – Le principe de précaution doit être appliqué par les humains qui préparent ou décident l'attaque	435
Conclusion : un prescrit légal, reflet de considérations éthiques	437
CHAPTER 2. – From the Regulation of Artificial Intelligence by Society to the Regulation of Society by Artificial Intelligence: All Along the Watchtower	441
Jerome DE COOMAN	
Introduction	441
I. – Regulation by Design: Two-Dimensional Definition Proposal	444
II. – Regulation of Human Behavior by Design	448
A. Automated Enforcement	450
B. Recommender systems	456
III. – Regulation of Technology by Design: The Case of Privacy	465
IV. – Laws of AI Designers	473
Conclusion	482
CHAPTER 3. – Breaking into the Black Box: How to Build Trust between Machine Learning-based Systems and their Users	485
Benoit FRÉNEY	
Bruno DUMAS	
I. – A Need for Machine Learning-Based Systems that Can Be Trusted	486
II. – Interpretability & Explainability, Interactivity, Constraint Enforcement	487
Conclusion	489
References	489
CHAPTER 4. – AI as a Medical Device: Between the Medical Devices Framework and the General AI Regulation	491
Anastasiya KISELEVA	
I. – Introduction	491

II. – How Does the EC Proposal for AI Regulation Deal with Limitations of the Medical Devices Framework in Terms of AI’s Transparency and Accountability?	493
A. Limitations in the Regulated Subjects	493
B. Limitations in the Regulatory Scope	495
C. Limitations in Procedures	496
1. Self-learning of AI	496
2. Control over data	498
III. – The Synergy of the Two Frameworks	499
IV. – What Else Is Needed	501
V. – Conclusion	507
CHAPTER 5. – Negotiating the Legal Status of Artificial Intelligence Systems in Future Societies	509
Diana Mădălina Mocanu	
CHAPTER 6. – About some international documents relating to the ethics of Artificial Intelligence – Some insights	523
Yves POULLET	
Table of contents	541